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Abstract. We present a bandwidth-efficient off-line anonymous e-cash scheme with traceable coins. Once a user double-spends, his identity can be revealed and all his coins in
the system can be traced, without resorting to TTP. For a security level comparable with
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of the proposed scheme is proven under the q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption and the
decisional linear assumption, in the random oracle model. The transcript size of our scheme
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we propose a variant such that there exists a TTP with the power to revoke the identity of
a payee and trace all coins from the same user, which may be desirable when a malicious
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Introduction

To conduct business transaction over the Internet, one of the ways to make payment is to use
e-cash. The simplest model of an e-cash scheme involves three types of parties: banks B, shops S,
and customers C. An e-cash scheme is a set of protocols which includes withdrawal (by C from B),
purchase (by C to S) and deposit (by S to B). In the electronic world, all objects are represented
by data; e-cash is by no means an exception. Special design can be incorporated in real cash to
prevent counterfeiting, but it is easy to duplicate e-cash. Thus it is necessary to prevent a user
from spending the same coin twice (double-spending).
Resembling real cash, it is desirable that the shop can accept a payment autonomously, without
consult any other parties, possibly the bank. E-cash scheme satisfying this property is described
as an off-line one. The coins are most probably spent in two different shops when they are doublespent. It is kind of impossible for the shops to check for double-spending on their own. Instead, the
bank checks for double-spending when the shops deposit the coins. Either the shops will get the
real payment, or the bank will identify the double-spender. On the other hand, honest spenders
cannot be slandered to have double spent (exculpability), and when the shops deposit the money
from the payee, the bank should not be able to trace who the actual spender is (anonymity).
Many e-cash systems allow the identification of double-spender have been proposed, but most
of them rely on the existence of a trusted third party (TTP) to revoke the anonymity (so as
to identify the double-spender) when double-spending occurs. The revocation is done probably
with the help of a database maintained by the bank, where certain tracing information obtained
during the withdrawal protocol are stored. This information is usually in an encrypted form that
is believed to be decryptable by the TTP only.
?

This is the full version of the work that appear in INDOCRYPT’06 under the same title. This work
was done when the first author is with University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong and the second author is
with New York University, USA
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Even though a secure e-cash system prevents the TTP from slandering an honest spender, the
revocation feature gives the TTP an elusive power to revoke the anonymity of honest spender
as well. To remove this high level of trust, an anonymous e-cash scheme should support ownertracing without TTP. Identity of double spender should be revoked while the identity of honest
user is always protected. To further punish the double spender, all coins spent (and possibly to
be spent) by a cheating user can be linked while the withdrawals and payments of an honest user
remains unlinkable. That is, certain information can be put in a blacklist so that the coin from
the double-spenders can be recognized when it is spent. Moreover, such coin-tracing can only be
(instead of trusted to be) performed after double-spending has occurred.
Recent proposal by Camenisch, Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya [8] supports traceability of owner
and coin without a TTP. Moreover, their scheme (hereinafter referred as CHL scheme) has the
distinctive feature that a user can withdraw more than one coin in a single withdrawal protocol,
and these coins can be spent in an unlinkable manner. Put it in a more formal way, 2` coins can
be withdrawn with the cost of O(` · k) instead of O(2` · k), where k is a security parameter. As a
result, a “compact electronic wallet” is made possible.
Our Contributions.
– We propose three short e-cash systems with different features:
1. identification and coin-tracing of double-spender without TTP.
2. even shorter payment transcript size.
3. owner-tracing and coin-tracing of honest users with the help of a TTP.
– We reinvestigate the efficiency of the CHL scheme, which includes the bandwidth requirements
in payment and deposit protocol, and also the bank’s storage requirement. We compare it with
our proposal for typical usage.
Organization. Next two sections discuss related works and technical preliminaries. We define our
security model in Section 4. The constructions of the e-cash systems are presented in Section 5,
accompanied by a comparison of our proposal with the CHL scheme. We conclude the paper in
Section 6.

2

Related Work

To protect the benefit of the banks, e-cash should deter counterfeiting. A secure digital signature,
being unforgeable, is a good candidate for implementing e-cash. The idea of blind signature was
proposed in [11] to support untraceable payment system. The bank can sign on the information
associated with the transaction in a blinded way without knowing the information about an
individual’s whereabouts and lifestyle. Beside, blind signature ensures unlinkability: even the bank
is given the message/signature pair at later stage, it is impossible to recollect the corresponding
invocation of signing protocol. However, the property that user can ask the bank to blindly sign
any message is undesirable. Cut-and-choose methodology was applied in [12] such that the bank
can ensure by statistical probability that the user has not presented a malformed message. But it
is very inefficient by nature. Alternatively, later research work proposed using variations of blind
signature scheme, such as restrictive blind signature [6] and partially blind signature [1], to prove
a user has not breached security.
Group signatures, introduced by Chaum and Heyst [13], allow individual members to make
signatures on behalf of the group. The identity of the actual signer is kept secret, but there is a TTP
that can revoke this anonymity. Group signature also provides “another kind” of unlinkability, such
that the signature produced by the same signer is unlinkable. These privacy-oriented properties
(signer-anonymity and unlinkability) have been utilized in various e-cash proposals. The concept
of “member” plays different roles in various e-cash proposal; for examples, the issuing banks [18],
the payees who spend the coins [18, 19, 24, 26], and the coins themselves (referred as “group of
coins” model) [10, 20].
The unlinkability of these signatures could be used maliciously, like money laundering and
obtaining a ransom safely [28]. Fair e-cash system, suggested independently by [7] and [25], can
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detect the misuse by criminal when necessary. In fair blind signature [25] and group signature, a
TTP can revoke the unlinkability and anonymity respectively. The existence of TTP is especially
useful in designing fair e-cash systems. Examples include [26, 19, 24, 10].
For detection of double-spending, the idea of cut-and-choose can also help. However, many
similar components are involved in the cash, which make the scheme inefficient. More efficient
mechanism involves a single-term only, an example is the secret sharing line method in [14, 15].
The technique to realize this “single-term” property may vary in different schemes [6, 14, 15, 21].
In the “group of coins” model, double-spending detection mechanism can be achieved by compromising the unlinkability of signer-anonymous signatures. Some schemes exploited this idea implicitly. For example, the scheme in [10] incorporated a “linkability tag” to the underlying group
signature scheme [2] to ensure the linkage of double-spent coins. As noted in [27], accusatory
linking that outputs the identity of the double-spender is needed for offline e-cash system, or the
cheater has already benefited by exchanging the double-spent coins with the goods or services
before the coins are voided by the bank.
In addition to double-spending detection, it is beneficial to have the coin-traceability, such that
all the coins withdrawn by a particular payee can be traced. Early fair e-cash systems either do
not support coin tracing (e.g. [19] and [26]), rely on the online participation of a TTP (e.g. [7]),
or rely on the offline presence of a TTP (e.g. [10] and [25]). Usually the TTP is overpowered.
For examples, the TTP in [17] can trace the coins spent by any honest user, and the TTP in the
linkable group signature extension of [27] can reveal the identity of any honest user. A new idea
of coin-tracing is to do , the coin-tracing without a TTP: any party can trace the coins of the
same payee once this payee double-spent [8]. The mechanism in [8] is efficient in the sense that
one-by-one checking on spent coins is not necessary, in contract with the traceable signatures in
[17].
Note that coin-traceability is different from double-spent coins detection. The later only applies
on the coins spent by a double-spender, but the former notion has said nothing about it. For
examples, the scheme in [22] and the e-cash system from the transaction escrow scheme in [16]
support coin-tracing of any user.

3

Preliminaries

We review concepts related to bilinear pairings ê : G1 × G2 → GT .
–
–
–
–
–

G1 and G2 are two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p.
g1 , g2 are generators of G1 and G2 respectively.
ψ is a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1 and ψ(g2 ) = g1 .
∀x ∈ G1 , y ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp , ê(xa , y b ) = ê(x, y)ab .
ê(g1 , g2 ) 6= 1.

G1 and G2 can be the same or different groups. We say that two groups (G1 , G2 ) are a bilinear
group pair if the group action in G1 , G2 , the isomorphism ψ and the bilinear mapping ê are all
efficiently computable.
Definition 1 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman). The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in
G is defined as follows: Given a quadruple (g, g a , g b , g c ) ∈ G4 , decides whether c = ab. We say that
the (t, )-DDH assumption holds in G if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least  in solving
the DDH problem in G.
Definition 2 (Decisional Linear Diffie-Hellman). The Decisional Linear Diffie-Hellman (DLDH)
problem in G1 is defined as follows: Given a sextuple in the form of (g1 , g2 , g3 , g1 a , g2 b , g3 c ) ∈ G1 6 ,
decides whether c = a + b. We say that the (t, )-DLDH assumption holds in G1 if no t-time
algorithm has advantage at least  in solving the DLDH problem in G1 .
DLDH problem is proposed and proven secure in the generic group model in [4].
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Definition 3 (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman). The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) problem in
2
q
(G1 , G2 ) is defined as follows: Given a (q + 2)-tuple (g1 , g2 , g2x , g2x , · · · , g2x ) ∈ G1 × Gq+1
, output
2
(x+c)
∗
a pair (A, c) such that A
= g1 where c ∈ Zp . We say that the (q, t, )-SDH assumption holds in
(G1 , G2 ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least  in solving the q-SDH problem in (G1 , G2 ).
Again, q-SDH problem is proven secure in the generic group model [3].
Definition 4 (eXternal Diffie-Hellman). The eXternal Diffie-Hellman (XDH) problem in
(G1 , G2 , GT ) is defined as solving the DDH problem in G1 given the following three efficient oracles
1. solving DDH problem in G2 ,
2. computing the isomorphism from G2 to G1 ,
3. and computing the bilinear mapping of groups G1 × G2 to GT .
We say that the (t, )-XDH assumption holds in (G1 , G2 , GT ) if no t-time algorithm has advantage
at least  in solving the XDH problem in (G1 , G2 , GT ).
The above assumption implies that the isomorphism is computationally one-way, i.e. there does
not efficient way to complete ψ −1 : G1 → G2 . The discussion on the choice of elliptic curves which
can make the above assumption hold can be found in [4]. In short, the bilinear groups (G1 , G2 )
should be instantiated using the Weil or Tate pairing over MNT curves; but not supersingular
curves.

4
4.1

Security Model of E-Cash System
Framework

An anonymous e-cash system consists of three parties: the bank, the user and the merchant,
together with the following six algorithms.
– Setup. On input an unary string 1λ , where λ is a security parameter, the algorithm outputs a
master secret key s and a list of publicly known system’s parameter param. In an anonymous
e-cash, the master secret key is owned by the bank which allows it to issue electronic coins.
– User Setup. On input of param, randomly outputs a key pair (pk, sk).
– Withdrawal. The user with input (pk, sk) withdraws a electronic coin from the bank. The
bank responses with input s. After executing the protocol, the user obtains the coin c while
the bank retains certain information τw which allows it to trace the user should this user
double-spends some coin. The bank maintains a database for this trace information.
– Payment. The user with input c spends. The merchant response with input param. After the
protocol the merchant obtains a transcript including a proof of validity π of the coin c, and
possibly some auxiliary information aux, and outputs 0/1, depending whether the payment is
accepted.
– Deposit. The merchant submits (π, aux) to the bank for deposit. The bank outputs 0/1,
indicating whether the deposit is accepted. It is required whenever a honest merchant obtains
(π, aux) by running the Payment protocol with some user, there is a guarantee that this coin
will be accepted by the bank. The bank adds (π, aux) to the database of spent coins.
– Owner tracing (of double-spender). Whenever a user double spent, this algorithm allows
the bank to identify the double spender. Formally, on input two payment protocol transcripts
from the same coin c, the algorithm outputs the public key pk of the owner of coin c.
– Coin tracing (of double-spender). Whenever a user double spent, this algorithm allows
the bank to publish some tracing information so that all spending of the same user are identified. Formally, on input two payment transcripts from the same coin c of the same owner pk,
outputs a set of information {tag} so that anyone with {tag} can identify all coins from user
(with public key pk) during the payment protocol.
We stress that the difference between fair e-cash and anonymous e-cash is that, in the former
case, there exists a TTP which can revoke the anonymity of the coin and hence the privacy of the
user. Whether this is desirable or not depends the application as the unconditional anonymity can
be misused for illegal purposes such as money laundering or perfect blackmailing.
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Security Definition

Security properties are described informally at first.
– Correctness. If an honest user runs Withdrawal with an honest bank and runs Payment with
an honest merchant, the merchant accepts the coin. The merchant later runs Deposit with
the bank, which will accept the coin.
– Balance. It means that no collusion of users and merchants can ever spend more coins than they
withdrew. This is the most important property from the bank’s point of view. We require that
the adversary, after running qu Withdrawal protocol with the bank, cannot run the Deposit
protocol successfully with the bank for qu + 1 times. A deposit query is successful if either
(1) the bank accepts the coin or (2) the bank identifies the coin is being double-spent but is
unable to identify the double spender1 .
– Identification of double-spenders. It is required that suppose a user double spent, he must be
identified.
– Tracing of double-spenders It is required that if a user double spent, all of his other coins can
be traced regardless of it is spent honestly or not.
– Anonymity of users Even when the bank cooperates with any coalition of users and merchants,
cannot learn anything about an honest user’s spending.
– Exculpability An honest user cannot be accused of having double spent.
We focus on Balance and Anonymity, the two most important requirements of e-cash system.
The capabilities of an adversary A is modeled as oracles that answers the following queries from
the adversary.
– Withdrawal queries: A engages in the withdrawal protocol as user and obtains a valid coin.
– Payment queries: A engages in the deposit protocol as a merchant.
– Hash queries: A can ask for the values of the hash functions for any input.
We require that the answers from the oracles are indistinguishable from the view as perceived by
an adversary in real world attack.
Balance. The following game played between a challenger C and an adversary A formally defines
the Balance property.
Definition 5 (Game Balance).
– (Initialization Phase.) The challenger C takes a large security parameter λ and runs the Setup
to generate a list of system’s parameters param and also a master secret key s. C keeps s to
itself and sends param to A.
– (Probing Phase.) The adversary A can perform a polynomially bounded number of queries to
the oracles in an adaptive manner.
A wins the above game if the number of successful withdrawal queries plus payment queries is
less than that of successful deposit queries. A deposit query is successful if either the bank accepts
the deposit request or the bank identifies double-spent but is unable to identify the double spender.
The advantage of A is defined as the probability that A wins.
Definition 6 (Balance). An e-cash game is said to have the Balance property if no adversary
has a non-negligible advantage in the game Balance.
1

It is assumed that the bank holds the responsibility to charge the double-spender, so the merchant is
credited even if the coin has been identified to have been double-spent. An honest merchant may not be
able to detect double-spending in an off-line anonymous e-cash system. Thus, condition (2) is included
in the definition of balance.
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Anonymity. The following game played between a challenger C and an adversary A formally
defines the anonymity of e-cash system.
Definition 7 (Game Anonymity).
– (Initialization Phase.) The challenger C takes a sufficiently large security parameter λ and
runs the Setup to generate a list of system’s parameters param and also the bank’s secret key
s. C gives s and param to A.
– (Challenge Phase.) The adversary A runs the withdrawal protocol with C. Then C runs
deposit protocol with A acting as the bank.
– (End Game Phase.) The adversary A decides if the underlying coin of the two runs are the
same.
A wins the above game if it guesses correctly. The advantage of A is defined as the probability
that A wins minus 21 .
Definition 8 (Anonymity). A e-cash scheme is anonymous if no adversary has a non-negligible
advantage in the game Anonymity.

5

Our Proposed E-Cash Systems

Global parameters for both systems. Let λ be the security parameter. (G1 , G2 ) is a bilinear
group pair with computable isomorphism ψ as discussed. |G1 | = |G2 | = p for some prime p of λ
bits. H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp is a cryptographic hash function. We assume there exists a group Gp of
order p where DDH is hard.
5.1

Short E-Cash

We present a short E-Cash system that supports identification and coin tracing of double-spender
without the need of a TTP. We require the user to verifiably encrypt the tracing information
under his own public key during the withdrawal protocol, assuming PKI is deployed. By using
technique in [6], secret key of the double-spender can be extracted, and thus tracing information
can be decrypted.
– Bank Setup. The bank’s public key is bpk = (g1 , g2 , w, h1 , h2 , h3 , u, v, h, ht ) and the private
key bsk = γ, generated as follows.
1. Randomly generates generator g2 ∈ G2 and sets g1 = ψ(g2 ).
2. Randomly selects γ ∈R Z∗p and sets w = g2 γ .
3. Randomly selects generators h1 , h2 , h3 , u, v ∈R G1 .
4. Randomly selects generators h, ht of Gp .
– User Setup. Each user is equipped a discrete logarithm type of public and private key pair
(hs , s) ∈ Gp × Z∗p .
– Withdrawal Protocol. When a user with public key y = hs ∈ Gp wants to withdraw money
from the bank, the following protocol is executed.
1. User selects ā, b̄ such that āb̄ = s, computes C̄ = hā1 hb̄2 ∈ G1 , and a signature based on
proofs of knowledge (SPK) Π1 that C̄ is correctly formed. User sends (C̄, Π1 ) to the bank.
2. The bank verifies that Π1 is valid, randomly generates r and sends it back to the user.
3. User then computes a = ār, b = b̄r−1 , C = h1 a h2 b , and computes the encryption R of ht a
and ht b under its public key hs for coin tracing. User sends to the bank C, R and SPK
Π2 that they are correctly formed.
1
4. The bank verifies that Π2 is valid, randomly selects x ∈R Z∗p and computes A = (g1 C) γ+x ∈
G1 . The bank sends (A, x) back to the user.
5. The bank keeps (A, x, C, Π2 ) in record and debits the user accordingly.
6. User checks if the coin (A, x, a, b) satisfies ê(A, wg2x ) = ê(g1 ha1 hb2 , g2 ).
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The encryption and the proof Π1 and Π2 are shown in the appendix.
– Payment Protocol. Suppose the user spends the coin (A, x, a, b) to a merchant with the identity I ∈ {0, 1}∗ . the following protocol is executed.
1. User randomly generates α, β ∈R Z∗p , computes the auxiliary commitment A1 = uα , A2 =
v β , A3 = Ah3 α+β , and tracing information B1 = ht a and B2 = ht b . {A1 , A2 , A3 } ∈ G1
and {B1 , B2 } ∈ Gp .
2. User computes two helper values δα = xα and δβ = xβ.
3. User undertakes a proof of knowledge of values (α, β, x, a, b, δα , δβ ) satisfying the relations:
A1
A2
Ax1
Ax2
B1
B2
ê(g1 ,g2 )
ê(A3 ,w)

= uα
= vβ
= uδα
= v δβ
= ht a
= ht b
= ê(A3 , g2 )x ê(h3 , g2 )−(δα +δβ ) ê(h3 , w)−(α+β) ê(h1 , g2 )−a ê(h2 , g2 )−b

This proof of knowledge proceeds as follow.
• (Auxiliary Commitment.) User computes A1 , A2 , A3 , B1 , B2 as above.
• (Commitment.) User randomly selects rα , rβ , rx , ra , rb , rδα , rδβ ∈R Z∗p , computes
T1 = urα , T2 = v rβ , T3 = Ar1x u−rδα , T4 = Ar2x v −rδβ ,
(r )
T5 = ê(A3 , g2 )rx ê(h3 , g2 )−rδα −rδβ ê(h3 , w)−rα −rβ ê(h1 , g2 )−ra ê(h2 , g2 )−rb , T6 = ht a
(rb )
and T7 = ht . T1 , T2 , T3 , T4 are in G1 , T5 is in GT and T6 , T7 are in Gp .
• (Challenge.) Merchant sends the transaction information M to user. User computes
c = H(A1 , A2 , A3 , B1 , B2 , T1 , T2 , T3 , T4 , T5 , T6 , T7 , M, I).
• (Response.) User computes sα = rα − cα, sβ = rβ − cβ, sx = rx − cx, sδα = rδα − cδα ,
sδβ = rδβ − cδβ , sa = ra − ca, sb = rb − cb and st = a − cb. User sends (σ, c, st ) to
merchant, where σ = (A1 , A2 , A3 , B1 , B2 , sα , sβ , sx , sa , sb , sδα , sδβ ).
• (Verify.) Merchant computes
∗ T˜1 = Ac1 usα , T˜2 = Ac2 v sβ , T˜3 = As1x u−sδα , T˜4 = As2x v −sδβ ,
ê(A3 ,g2 )sx
ê(g1 ,g2 ) c
)
,
∗ T˜5 = ( ê(A
(sδ +sδ )
(sα +s )
3 ,w)
s
α
ê(h3 ,g2 )

β

ê(h3 ,w)

β

ê(h1 ,g2 )sa ê(h2 ,g2 )

b

∗ T˜6 = B1c ht sa , T˜7 = B2c ht sb .
?
?
Accepts if c = H(A1 , A2 , A3 , B1 , B2 , T˜1 , T˜2 , T˜3 , T˜4 , T˜5 , T˜6 , T˜7 , M ) and B1 = B2c ht st both
hold and rejects otherwise.
– Deposit Protocol. The merchant with identity I sends the payment transcript (σ, c, st ) and
M to the bank. The bank verifies the payment transcript exactly as the merchant did. In
addition, the bank has to verify that I is indeed the identity of the merchant and (M, σ) is
not used before by that merchant. This is to prevent colluding users and merchants submitting double spent coin (which have completely identical transcript). The bank also checks for
double-spending by searching if the (B1 , B2 ) is already existing in some entry in the deposit
database. If it is not found, (B1 , B2 , c, st ) is stored and the payment is accepted as valid.
Otherwise it is a doubly-spent coin.
– Owner Tracing. Let the two payment transcripts are (σ, c, st ) and (σ 0 , c0 , s0t ), the bank coms −s0
putes b̂ = ct0 −ct and â = st + cb̂. The private key and the public key of the double-spender are
ŝ = âb̂ and ŷ = hŝ respectively.
– Coin Tracing. The bank decrypts the value ht a and ht b for all other coins issued to the
double-spender by the exposed key pair.
5.2

Shorter e-cash

We can further shorten our payment transcript to 192 bytes with the XDH assumption. We
highlight the changes from the short e-cash system as follow.
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– Bank Setup. Basically the same except the bank’s public key is shortened to bpk = (g1 , g2 , w,
h1 , h2 , h, u, v).
– User Setup. Basically the same except the group Gp is replaced with G1 .
– Withdrawal Protocol. The coin (A, x, a, b) is generated with the same mechanism and hence
Ax+γ = g1 ha1 hb2 still holds. But the tracing information becomes A1 = ua and A3 = ub . To
accommodate the changes, we need a new SPK Π3 instead of the original Π2 . Again Π3 is
shown in the appendix.
– Payment Protocol. User spends the coin (A, x, a, b) to a merchant by executing the following
protocol.
1. User computes auxiliary commitment A1 = ua , A2 = Av a , A3 = ub and a helper value
δ = xa.
2. User undertakes a proof of knowledge of values (a, b, x, δ) satisfying A1 = ua , Ax1 =
ê(g1 ,g2 )
. This proof of
uδ , A3 = ub , ê(A2 , g2 )x ê(v, g2 )−δ ê(v, w)−a ê(h1 , g2 )−a ê(h2 , g2 )−b = ê(A
2 ,w)
knowledge proceeds as follow.
• (Auxiliary Commitment.) User computes A1 , A2 , A3 as above.
• (Commitment.) User randomly selects ra , rb , rx , rδ ∈R Z∗p , computes
∗ T1 = ura , T2 = Ar1x u−rδ ,
∗ T3 = ê(A2 , g2 )rx ê(v, g2 )−rδ ê(v, w)−ra ê(h1 , g2 )−ra ê(h2 , g2 )−rb .
• (Challenge.) Merchant sends the transaction information M ∈ {0, 1}∗ to user. User
computes c = H(A1 , A2 , A3 , T1 , T2 , T3 , M ).
• (Response.) User computes sa = ra − ca, sb = rb − cb, sx = rx − cx, sδ = rδ − cδ and
st = a − cb. User sends (σ, c, st ) to the merchant, where σ = (A1 , A2 , A3 , sa , sb , sx , sδ ).
• (Verify.) Merchant computes T˜1 = Ac1 usa , T˜2 = As1x u−sδ and
ê(g1 ,g2 ) c
) ê(A2 , g2 )sx ê(v, g2 )−sδ ê(v, w)−sa ê(h1 , g2 )−sa ê(h2 , g2 )−sb .
T˜3 = ( ê(A
2 ,w)
?
?
Accepts if both of c = H(A1 , A2 , A3 , T˜1 , T˜2 , T˜3 , M ) and A1 = Ac3 ust hold, rejects
otherwise.
– Deposit Protocol. Merchant sends the payment transcript (σ, c, st ) to bank for deposit. In
the enhanced protocol, double-spending is identified by the pair (A1 , A3 ) (instead of (B1 , B2 )).
– Owner Tracing. Suppose the two transcripts are (σ, c, st ) and (σ 0 , c0 , s0t ), the bank computes
s −s0
b̂ = ct0 −ct and â = st + cb̂. The private key and the public key of the double-spender are ŝ = âb̂
and ŷ = hŝ respectively.
– Coin Tracing. The bank can decrypt the values ua and ub for all other coins issued to the
double-spender for tracing.

5.3

Short E-Cash with TTP

In some scenario, the law enforcing agency got the knowledge of a certain criminal by noncryptographic means, and wants to stop this user from using his coins (which has already been
withdrawn). This can be achieved by incorporating a TTP in our scheme for revoking identity and
coin tracing of all users.
For our first proposed scheme, instead of having h3 , u, v generated fairly, the TTP selects ξ1 ,
ξ2 such that h3 = uξ1 = v ξ2 . The TTP can revoke the identity of every spender by computing
A = A3 /(Aξ11 Aξ22 ) and identifying the spender from the withdrawal transcript. For the shorter
version, TTP’s private-public key pair is (ξ, v = uξ ). To revoke the identity of the spender, TTP
computes A = A2 /(Aξ1 ) for the bank to identify the spender from the withdrawal protocol.
Coin tracing can be achieved by requiring users to encrypt tracing information ({hat , hbt }, or
a
{u , ub } for the shorter version) under TTP’s public key. In fact, coin tracing and owner tracing
power can be held by different TTP, and each feature can be independently incorporated, by using
different proofs in SP K. Due to space limitations, details can be found in the full paper.
5.4

Security Analysis

The security of our system is assured by the following theorems. Their proofs can be found in
Appendix B. The security analysis of the shorter version goes in a similar way.

Short E-Cash
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Theorem 1 (Balance). Our proposed construction has the balance property under the q-SDH
assumption, in the random oracle model.
Theorem 2 (Anonymity). Our proposed construction has the anonymity property under the
DLDH assumption in G1 and DDH assumption in Gp , in the random oracle model.
5.5

Comparison with Compact E-cash

We compare the bandwidth and the storage requirement of our scheme with the second scheme in
[8] (which supports full coin-tracing). In the following comparison, we instantiate the CHL scheme
with a 1024-bit RSA modulus. For our scheme, we take p be a 170-bit prime with the families
of curves described in [5]. Using the standard point compression technique, each element in G1 is
171-bit. Each coin consists of one element in G1 and three elements in Z∗p . The coin size is thus
681 bits. Each payment transcript contains three elements in G1 (A1 , A2 , A3 ), two elements in
Gp (B1 , B2 ) and nine element in Z∗p , making its length 512 bytes, if we assume elements in Gp
is representable in 1024 bits. As for the shorter version, each payment transcript contains three
elements in G1 (A1 , A2 , A3 ) and six elements in Z∗p , making its length 192 bytes.
In the CHL scheme, the withdrawal protocol enables the user to withdraw 2` coins at a time. For
the payment and deposit protocols, only one coin is processed each time. The space complexity
of the withdrawal, payment and deposit transcript are all of order `. In the payment protocol,
the user needs to compute 7 + 9` auxiliary commitments together with 17 + 21` commitments
during the SPKs, and the response takes about 20` elements. The payment transcript size is
about (24 + 50`) × 1024 bits. Taking ` = 10, spending one coin requires transmission bandwidth
of 1024 × (24 + 500) bits, i.e. around 60 Kilobytes. In our scheme, each payment transcript is
of constant size 512 bytes. Our scheme’s bandwidth requirement in payment is 100 times more
efficient.
The withdrawal protocol of the CHL scheme require some more investigation. Without counting
the verifiable encryption, the bandwidth required for withdrawing 2` coins is (2 + 3`) × 1024 bits,
which is very efficient per coin. However, the verifiable encryption is rather inefficient in itself. For
a cheating probability lower than 2k , the user is required to perform 2k encryptions while the bank
must perform k encryptions. After this process, the bank needs to store all these 2k encryption
transcripts later decryption. The verifiable encryption on s is to be performed with relative to the
Pedersen commitment A = g0 r g1 u g2 s gi ti for i = 3 to 3` + 3. Precisely speaking, k rounds of the
verifiable encryption has to be done, with each round consisting of one commitment, two bilinear
El Gamal encryptions, and 3` + 3 responses (the 3` + 3 term arise since the user has to proof that
encryption on s is correctly formed with respect to A, which contains 3 + 3` exponents). Suppose
each component is of size 1024-bit, the total transcript size is (4 + 3`)/8 kilobytes for each round,
making the total transmission requirement of k(4 + 3`)/8 kilobytes.
A simple trick to simplify the computation is to compute another Pedersen commitment
0
B = g0r g1 s , proved that the term s in both A and B are the same, and do the verifiable encryption with respect to B. In this case, each round is of size 5 × 1024 bits, and a total of 5k/8
kilobytes for k rounds. After that, the bank need to store this 5k/8 kilobytes of information for
later decryption. Thus, bandwidth requirement for CHL’s withdrawal protocol per coin (including
kilobytes.
verifiable encryption using the improved method) is 2+3`+5k
8·2`
For a cheating probability of 0.001(k = 10)2 and taking ` = 10 , the average storage per coin
required is 10 bytes, using the improved protocol. In our scheme, this kind of inefficient verifiable
encryption is not needed with the help of SPK Π2 . A total of 873 bytes is required for each coin
(the number of bits required by SPK Π1 , Π2 is 1363 and 5627 bits respectively), and the bank
only needs to store 512 bytes of the encrypted information for each coin.
In short, our scheme is about 50 times less efficient per coin in the withdrawal protocol, and
100 times more bandwidth efficient per coin during the payment protocol and the deposit protocol.
2

It is worth noting that using k = 10 is in favor of the CHL scheme since the cheating probability of our
scheme is 1/q with q being a 170-bit prime.
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Withdrawal can be done by a desktop while the payment may be done in a mobile device with
lower computational power and storage. We believe that our scheme is an improvement over the
CHL scheme.

6

Conclusion

Double spender tracing is important in an anonymous e-cash system. Coin tracing may be even
more important as the bank can freeze the possible misbehavior of a double-spender. Most existing
systems relies on the existence of an over-powered TTP, which may identify the spender of a coin
and trace all the coins by a particular spender, even the spender is an honest one who never
double-spend. Recently, Camenisch, Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya proposed an e-cash system
with traceable coins [8]. Once a user double-spends, his identity can be revealed and all his coins
in the system can be traced, without resorting to TTP. Their scheme is “compact” in the sense
that a user can withdraw 2` coins in a single withdrawal protocol with the cost of O(` · k), and the
coins can be spent in an unlinkable manner. This result is theoretically very efficient. However,
we identify that the bandwidth requirements in payment and deposit protocol, and the bank’s
storage, may not be efficient for realistic scenario.
In this paper, we present a bandwidth-efficient off-line anonymous e-cash scheme with traceable coins. For a security level comparable with 1024-bit standard RSA signature, the payment
transcript size is only 512 bytes. Security of the proposed scheme is proven under the q-strong
Diffie-Hellman assumption and the decisional linear assumption, in the random oracle model. The
transcript size of our scheme can be further reduced to 192 bytes if external Diffie-Hellman assumption is made. To the best of authors’ knowledge, it is the shortest e-cash system currently
available. We also show how to incorporate a TTP that is responsible for the owner-tracing and
coin-tracing, if such a TTP is desired.
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Signature Knowledge of Representation

A signature of knowledge allows a signer to prove the knowledge of a secret with respect to some
public information non-interactively by tying his knowledge of a secret to a message begin signed.
Following the notion in [9], we called these signature “Signatures based on Proofs of Knowledge”
(SPK).
As an example, we denote the zero-knowledge proof of the discrete logarithm of y by
SPK{(x) : y = g x }(M ),
where M is the hash value of the commitment.
The SPK Π1 , Π2 and Π3 used in our proposal are shown below.
Π1 can be realised as the following SPK:
^
^
^
SPK{(ā, b̄, s, r1 , δ) : C̄ = hā1 hb̄2 A1 = hr11 hā2
Ab̄1 = hδ1 hs2 y = hs }(M )
where M = H(C̄, A1 , y, h1 , h2 , ).
−1
For Π2 , first compute A1 = C̄ r and A2 = C̄ r and execute the following SPK:


 C̄ = hā1 hb̄2 V A1 = ha1 hδb V A2 = hδa hb2 V C = ha1 hb2 V
2
1
V
V
V
ā, b̄, a, b, δa , δb , ta , tb :
SPK
(M ),
R1 = hta R2 = y ta hat R3 = htb y tb hbt
where M = H(C̄, A1 , A2 , C, R1 , R2 , R3 , R4 , h1 , h2 , y). Note that R1 ,R2 ,R3 ,R4 is the encryption of
hat and hbt under the public key y = hs .
−1
For Π3 , first compute A1 = C̄ r and A2 = C̄ r and execute the following SPK:


 C̄ = hā1 hb̄2 V A1 = ha1 hδb V A2 = hδa hb2 V C = ha1 hb2 V
2
1
V
V
V
V
SPK ā, b̄, δa , δb , a, b, s :
(M ),
y = hs R1 = ht1 R2 = y t1 ua R3 = ht2 R4 = y t2 ub
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where M = H(C̄, C, A1 , A2 , R1 , R2 , R3 , R4 , y, h1 , h2 , u, v). Note that R1 , R2 , R3 , R4 is the
encryption of ua and v b under the public key y = hs .

B
B.1

Security Proofs for Short E-cash
Balance

Proof (Theorem 1). Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A which can win game balance, we
construct a PPT simulator S that solves the q-SDH problem.
q
Suppose the S receives a random instance of the q-SDH problem (g10 , g20 , g20γ , · · · , g20γ ), by
applying the technique of Boneh and Boyen in the proof of Lemma 3.2 in [3], S computes generators
g1 ∈ G1 , g2 ∈ G2 , w = g2 γ and q − 1 SDH pairs (Āi , xi )) such that ê(Āi , xi ) = ê(g1 , g2 ) for each i.
Any SDH pair (Ā, x) besides these q − 1 pairs can be transformed into the solution of the q-SDH
problem due to the technique in the same lemma. S interacts with A as follow.
Setup. Given G1 , G2 , g1 , g2 where g1 = ψ(g2 ) and w = g2 γ , together with a list of pairs (Āi , xi )
such that ê(Āi , xi ) = ê(g1 , g2 ) for i = 1, . . . , q−1. S randomly selects x∗ , a∗ , c∗ , µ and computes
∗
1
∗
∗
∗
∗
h1 = ψ([(wg1 x )c g1 −1 ]1/a ) and h2 = hµ1 . Notice that g1 c = (g1 h1 a ) γ+x∗ . S also randomly
generates h3 , u, v, h, ht . S reports the bank’s public key as bpk = (g1 , g2 , w, h1 , h2 , h3 , u, v, h, ht ).
In actual practice, the bank has to prove that the generators are fairly generated, most likely by
setting them as the hash output of some random seed. The above can be done by back-patching
the hash oracle. The public key is then given to A.
Hash Queries. S maintains a list for the hash query. When A asks for the hash value, S checks
the list and returns the same answer to A if it has been asked before. Otherwise, randomly
generates a value to answer A’s value and keep the value and the query in the list.
Withdrawal Queries. Suppose the adversary makes at most q + 1 withdrawal queries. S randomly chooses one query (query *) and handle it as follow. Upon receiving C̄ ∗ ,S performs a
rewind simulation to obtain ā∗ and b̄∗ . Computes r∗ such that ā∗ r∗ + µb̄∗ r∗ −1 = a∗ . Continues
∗
to follow the protocol and returns (g c , x∗ ) as the coin.
For other queries i, S follows the protocol upon receiving Ci , Π2,i , when it performs a rewind
simulation to obtain ai and bi . Computes āi = ai + µbi . Computes Ai as following, using an
SDH pair (Āi , xi ).
āi
γ+xi

1

Ai = (g1 hā1 i ) γ+xi = Āi h1
= Āi g1

āi c∗ (γ+x∗ )−āi
a∗ (γ+xi )
ā

(1− a∗i )

= (Āi

)([g1

āi c∗
a∗

(1−

]

ā
(x −x∗ )(ā c∗ )
(1− a∗i − i a∗ i
)

= (Āi

xi −x∗
γ+xi

)(g1

)

)

āi c∗
a∗

)

Returns (Ai , xi ) as the coin. It is straight forward to show that the simulation is perfect and
the adversary cannot distinguish which query is query ∗.
Payment Queries. S randomly generates A1 , A2 , A3 , B2 , chooses st , c computes B1 = B2c hst t
and simulates a payment transcript (σ, c, M ) using standard technique in the random oracle
model.
Deposit Queries. S follows the normal deposit protocol as an honest bank.
Output. Finally, if A is successful, it has submitted q + 2 tuples of (σ, c, M ) such that c =
H(A1 , A2 , A3 , B1 , B2 , T˜1 , T˜2 , T˜3 , T˜4 , T˜5 , T˜6 , T˜7 , M ) and is not the output from the payment
queries.
Extractor. We firstly describe how to extract a coin (A, x, a, b) given two payment transcripts
(A1 , A2 , A3 , B1 , B2 , sα , sβ , sx , sa , sb , sδα , sδβ , ci , M ) and
(A1 , A2 , A3 , B1 , B2 , s0α , s0β , s0x , s0a , s0b , s0δα , s0δβ , c0i , M ).
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0

0

– By Ac1 usα = Ac1 usα , A1 = u

–

s0α −sα
c−c0

. Similarly, A2 = v

s0β −sβ
c−c0

0
0
s −s0
and β̃ respectively. Then from 1 = A1x x usδα −sδα , usδα −sδα
0
0
s −s
α(sx − s0x ). Similarly, from 1 = A2x x v sδα −sδα , sδβ − s0δβ =
0
0
ê(g1 ,g2 ) c−c0
By 1 = [ ê(A
]
ê(A3 , g2 )sx −sx ê(h, g2 )−[(α+β)+(sx −sx )]
3 ,w)
0

0

s0α −sα s0α −sα
c−c0 , c−c0 by
0
= uα(sx −sx ) and sδα − s0δα
β(sx − s0x ).

. Denote

α̃
=

0

ê(h, w)−[(α̃+β̃)−(c−c )] ê(h1 , g2 )sa −sa ê(h2 , g2 )sb −sb , we have
s0x −sx
c−c0

s0a −sa
c−c0

s0b −sb
c−c0

) = ê(g1 h1
h2
, g2 ).
ê(A3 h−(α̃+β̃) , wg2
s0x −sx
s0a −sa
−(α̃+β̃)
Set Ã = A3 h
, x̃ = c−c0 ,ã = c−c0 and b̃ =
0

s0

s0a −sa
0

s0b −sb
c−c0 .
0

s0

– From B1c hst a = B1c ht a , B1 = ht c−c = hãt . Similarly, by B2c hst b = B2c ht b , we have B2 = hb̃t .
– We obtain Ã, x̃, ã, b̃ satisfying ê(Ã, wg2x̃ ) = ê(g1 h1 ã h2 b̃ , g2 ) and A1 = uα̃ , A2 = v β̃ , A3 =
Ãhα̃+β̃ , B1 = hãt and B2 = hb̃t .
The adversary can be of two types. For type I, all payment transcripts are unlinked, that is,
each pair of (B1 , B2 ) is unique. For type II, some pairs of (B1 , B2 ) are the same (that is, the
coin has been double-spent) but the double-spender cannot be identified. We treat these two
cases separately.
Type I Adversary
– S randomly chooses one payment transcript (σi , ci , M ). For simplicity, we drop the subscript i. By forking lemma[23], obtains (σ 0 , c0 , M 0 ) such that A1 , A2 , A3 , B1 , B2 and T1 , T2 ,
T3 , T4 , T5 , T6 , T7 of both σ’s are the same and c 6= c0 .
– Using the extractor above, S obtains (Ã, x̃, ã, b̃). Since all transcripts are unlinked, with
1
, the pair (ã, b̃) is different from all pairs of (a, b) in the withdrawal
probability at least q+2
queries. Denote ã + µb̃ by y. There are three possibilities.
• Case I: x̃ 6= xi for all i or x̃ 6= x∗ .
Ã(γ+x̃) = g1 hy1
Ã(γ+x̃) = g1 (

c∗ y(x∗ +γ)−y
)
a∗
a∗ −y

Ã = (g1 a∗ (γ+x̃) )[(g1
1
γ+x̃

g1

−c∗ y
a∗

= [Ãg1

]

c∗ y
a∗

)(1−

x̃−x∗
γ+x̃

)

]

a∗
a∗ −y−cy(x̃−x∗ )

S uses this new SDH pair to solve the original q-SDH problem.
• Case II: x̃ = xi or x∗ and Ã = Ai or A∗ but the pair (B1 , B2 ) are different. Then S
solves the discrete logarithm of h2 to base h1 .
1
• Case III: x̃ = xi or x∗ for some i and Ã 6= Ai or A∗ . With probability q+2
, x̃ = x∗ .
Ã(γ+x

∗

)

= g1 hy1
a∗ −y

Ã = (g1 a∗ (γ+x∗ ) )(g1
1
γ+x∗

g1

−c∗ y
a∗

= [Ãg1

]

c∗ y
a∗

)

a∗
a∗ −y

S uses this new SDH pair to solve the original q-SDH problem.
Type II Adversary
– Let the payment transcripts i and j are identified as double-spent. ai = aj and bi = bj .
(ai , bi ) can be computed from the relationship B1 = B2c hst t in both transcripts. If (ai , bi )
corresponds to any pair of (a, b) in the withdrawal queries, then SPK Π2 guarantees that
the product of a and b gives the private key of (and hence identify) the double spender. If
(ai , bi ) corresponds to a new pair, following the idea of Type I Adversary shall complete
the reduction.
Let  be the success probability of A. The worst case for S is facing the Type I Adversary in

Case III and the corresponding probability is q+2
.
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Identification of Double-Spenders

Suppose there exists a PPT A which can double-spend without being identified, then A can break
the balance property.
B.3

Coin Tracing of Double-Spenders

After the double-spender has been identified, the bank computes the secret key of the user and
uses it to decrypt hat ,hbt from all withdrawal transcripts of the same user. The SPK Π2 guarantees
that the encryption of hat and hbt are correctly formed.
B.4

Exculpability

Given a payment transcript, the adversary’s goal is to produce another payment transcript that
can be linked to the spender. With coalition of the bank, the adversary can have (A, x, C̄ =
hā1 hb̄2 , r, C = ha1 hb2 ) where a = ār and b = b̄r−1 . The task of the adversary is to produce a proof of
knowledge of hat and hbt . It is difficult assuming discrete logarithm is hard.
B.5

Anonymity

Proof (Theorem 2). (Sketch) Suppose there exists a PPT machine A that can, on input the bank’s
view of withdrawal W and a payment transcript P , decide non-negligibly better than random
guessing, whether the coin used in P comes from W . Then the bank can use A to solve the DLDH
problem (assuming DDH holds in Gp ).
Consider the bilinear group pair G1 , G2 . Suppose the bank receives a random instance of the
DLDH problem u, v, h3 , uã , v b̃ , hc̃3 ∈ G1 and is going to answer if c̃ = ã + b̃. The bank interacts
with A as follow.
Setup. Selects g2 ∈ G2 and set g1 = ψ(g2 ). Selects γ and computes w = g2 γ . The bank’s public
key is bpk = (g1 , g2 , w, h1 , h2 , h3 , u, v, h, ht ) and bsk = γ.
Withdrawal Protocol. To simulate a user with public key pku , the bank follows the withdrawal
protocol, by using standard technique to simulate Π1 and Π2 . The simulation is not perfect,
but is indistinguishable from the actual transcript if DDH holds in Gp .
Payment Protocol. Set A1 = uã , A2 = v b̃ , A3 = Ahc̃3 where A is the secret of the coin during
the withdrawal protocol. Randomly generates B2 , computes B1 = B2c hst t and simulates the
transcript (σ, c, M ). This can be done by back-patching the hash value c. Note that B1 , B2
are not correctly formed but it is indistinguishable from A’s view under the DDH assumption
in Gp . A3 may or may not be correctly formed depends on whether c̄ = ā + b̄.
Answer. Transcript of the withdrawal protocol and that of the payment protocol are then given
to A. If A decided that the two transcripts are from the same user, then the bank concludes
that c̄ = ā + b̄. Otherwise, the bank answers no.
The bank can thus solve the DLDH problem if such a PPT A exists, under the DDH assumption
in Gp , in the random oracle model.

C

Short Fair E-Cash

Fair e-cash uses a TTP to achieve coin tracing and reveal identity of double spender. That is,
there exists a TTP who can revoke the identity of spender for any coin spent.
– Bank Setup. Randomly generates generator g2 ∈ G2 and set g1 = ψ(g2 ). Randomly select
γ ∈R Z∗p and set w = g2 γ . Randomly select generators h1 , h2 , h3 ∈R G1 . The bank’s public
key is bpk = (g1 , g2 , w, h1 , h2 , h3 ) and the private key bsk = γ.
– TTP Setup. Select h ∈R G1 and ξ1 , ξ2 ∈R Z∗p compute u,v such that uξ1 = v ξ2 = h. The TTP’s
public key is tpk = (u, v, h) and the private key tsk = (ξ1 , ξ2 ).
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– Withdrawal Protocol. When a user wants to withdraw money from the bank, they execute
the following protocol.
1. The user selects a,b ∈R Z∗p and computes C = ha1 hb2 . The user also encrypts the value
ha+b
under the public key of the TTP, that is, computes R1 = uαw , R2 = v βw , R3 =
3
αw +βw
ha+b
h
. The user needs to prove that (C, R1 , R2 , R3 ) is correctly formed by submit3
ting to the bank, C, R1 , R2 , R3 , together with ΠC =
SP K{(a, b, αw , βw ) : C = ha1 hb2 ∧ R1 = uαw ∧ R2 = v βw ∧ R3 = ha+b
hαw +βw }.
3
2. The bank first check The bank verifies that ΠC is valid and is not duplicated, randomly
1
selects x ∈R Z∗p and computes A = (g1 C) γ+x . The bank sends (A, x) back to the user and
record (A, x, C, ΠC ). The bank debits the user accordingly.
3. The coin of the user is (A, x, a, b) satisfying ê(A, wg2x ) = ê(g1 ha1 hb2 , g2 ).
– Payment Protocol. The user spends the coin (A, x, a, b) to a merchant by executing the following protocol.
1. Randomly generate α, β ∈R Z∗p , compute auxiliary values A1 = uα , A2 = v β , A3 = Ahα+β ,
A4 = h3a+b . Compute two helper values δα = xα and δβ = xβ.
2. Undertake a proof of knowledge of values (α, β, x, a, b, δα , δβ ) satisfying the relations:
and
A1 = uα , A2 = v β , Ax1 = uδα , Ax2 = v δβ , A4 = ha+b
3
ê(g1 ,g2 )
x
−(δα +δβ )
−(α+β)
−a
ê(A3 , g2 ) ê(h, g2 )
ê(h, w)
ê(h1 , g2 ) ê(h2 , g2 )−b = ê(A
. This proof of knowl3 ,w)
edge proceeds as follow.
• (Auxiliary Commitment.) User computes the auxiliary values A1 , A2 , A3 and A4 .
• (Commitment.) User randomly selects rα , rβ , rx , ra , rb , rδα , rδβ ∈R Z∗p , computes
T1 = urα , T2 = v rβ , T3 = Ar1x u−rδα , T4 = Ar2x v −rδβ ,
(r +r )
T5 = ê(A3 , g2 )rx ê(h, g2 )−(rδα +rδβ ) ê(h, w)−(rα +rβ ) ê(h1 , g2 )−ra ê(h2 , g2 )−rb and T6 = h3 a b .
∗
• (Challenge.) Merchant sends M ∈ {0, 1} to user , which contains the transaction
information. User computes
c = H(A1 , A2 , A3 , A4 , T1 , T2 , T3 , T4 , T5 , T6 , M ).
• (Response.) User computes sα = rα − cα, sβ = rβ − cβ, sx = rx − cx, sδα = rδα − cδα ,
sδβ = rδβ − cδβ , sa = ra − ca and sb = rb − cb. Set σ = (A1 , A2 , A3 , A4 , sα , sβ , sx , sa , sb ,
sδα , sδβ ) and sends σ, c to merchant.
• (Verify.) Merchant computes T˜1 = Ac1 usα , T˜2 = Ac2 usβ , T˜3 = As1x u−sδα , T˜4 = As2x v −sδβ ,
T˜6 = Ac4 h3 (sa +sb ) and
ê(A3 , g2 )sx
ê(g1 , g2 ) c
)
T˜5 = (
ê(A3 , w) ê(h, g2 )(sδα +sδβ ) ê(h, w)(sα +sβ ) ê(h1 , g2 )sa ê(h2 , g2 )sb
Check that

?
c = H(A1 , A2 , A3 , A4 , T˜1 , T˜2 , T˜3 , T˜4 , T˜5 , T˜6 , M ).

Accept if this check succeeds and reject otherwise.
– Deposit Protocol. The merchant sends σ, c, M to the bank which verifies exactly as the
merchant did. If the check is successful, the bank check for double-spending by searching if
A4 is already in the deposit database. If this value is not found, A4 is stored in the deposit
database and the payment is accepted as valid. On the other hand, if A4 has been found in the
deposit database, the bank send both σ’s to TTP. Given values A1 , A2 and A3 , TTP obtain
3
. With this A, the bank can identify the double spender.
A = ξA
1 ξ2
A1 A2

– Owner Tracing. Given σ, TTP obtain A =

A3
ξ
ξ
A11 A22

. The bank can identify the coin owner with

A.
– Coin Tracing. The bank sends the R1 , R2 , R3 in the withdrawal transcript to the TTP. TTP
3
obtain h3a+b = ξR
. This value can be put on a blacklist for recognizing it when it is spent.
1 ξ2
R1 R2
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– Correctness. It is straight forward to verify that an honest user runs withdrawal protocol
with an honest bank and then spends the coin with an honest merchant, then the merchant
accepts the coin.
Coin size and payment transcript length. Each coin is compose of one element in G1 and
three elements in Z∗p . Thus, a coin is of size 681 bits. Similarly, a payment transcript contains four
elements in G1 (A1 , A2 , A3 , A4 ) and eight elements in Z∗p (c, sα , sβ , sx , sa , sb , sδα , sδβ ). Thus, the
payment length is 2044 bits, or 256 bytes.

